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In April 2015, the DoD released a new cyber strategy in order to "guide the development of DoD's cyber forces and strengthen [its] cyber defense and cyber deterrence posture." 4 The Strategy identifies three cyber missions for DoD: (1) defending its own networks, systems, and data; (2) defending U.S. national interests against cyberattacks of "significant consequence," including loss of life, significant damage to property, serious adverse U.S. foreign policy consequences, and serious economic impact; and (3) when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, supporting military operations and contingency plans with cyber operations, including by disrupting an adversary's military-related networks.
DoD further laid out strategic goals aimed at ensuring its ability to accomplish these cyber missions, including goals to:
5  Build and maintain ready forces and capabilities to conduct cyber operations;
 Defend DoD networks, secure DoD data, and mitigate risks to DoD missions;
 Build and maintain viable cyber options, and plan to use them to control conflict escalation and shape the conflict environment at all stages. 1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
2 Implementation initiatives -and the attendant resources -to achieve these goals are needed in order to meet challenges associated with the rapid rate of change in technology, the growing cyber threat, and the need to integrate cyber operations with operations in other warfighting domains.
Cyber Workforce
Building and maintaining a qualified workforce underlies all of the goals of the Strategy. However, U.S. Cyber Command reports that it is "hard pressed" to identify, train, and retain qualified personal interest in and affinity for cyber. In fact, commercial practice for elite, highly paid cybersecurity jobs is to screen for such indications of aptitude and affinity in addition to formal educational requirements. These practices merit evaluation for implementation in DoD to ensure military and civilian staff are qualified to meet the challenges the Department faces.
Furthermore, the commercial sector reports that their ability to retain skilled personnel is closely linked to job satisfaction gained through good working environments, belief in the mission, opportunities for training and professional development, and access to interesting assignments.
Research indicates that corporate retention programs also seek to provide satisfying career paths for their cyber workforces, including not only a track to promotion through management but also a technical track. They also provide high performers opportunities to rotate among units to learn the business, and exposure to professional interaction outside the company.
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Though some worry that DoD hiring and retention suffers because it cannot keep pace with commercial pay, median salaries for corporate IT and cybersecurity professionals are similar to the pay and benefits for military personnel, when accounting for additional allowances and tax advantages. 11 One exception relates to the most elite cybersecurity professionals, those with unique skills that few possess (e.g., software reverse engineering, advanced malware analysis, identifying advanced stealthy attacks). These cyber "ninjas" are the competitive advantage for cutting-edge cybersecurity firms and are increasingly in demand in other corporate settings. The relative scarcity of these skill sets allows qualified individuals to command high salaries.
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Therefore, DoD might similarly find personnel with these unique skills to be worthy of retention programs not offered to the majority of the cyber workforce. ) enables an approach to personnel management consistent with fostering technical depth. Jobs that require the greatest technical depth and longevity may merit assignment of civilians, guard, and reserve personnel. Guard and reserve personnel may be particularly effective if they are also able to keep their technical skills sharp by working in a cyber-relevant civilian profession while not activated.
Finally, it is important to remember that despite DoD's growing emphasis on offensive and defensive cyber operations, the bulk of the DoD workforce is involved in the day-to-day job of securely configuring, monitoring, and maintaining DoD software applications and computer software and networks. Ensuring the availability of these networks and systems is vital to DoD. In addition, the duties, operational conditions, skillsets needed (and thus, training required) for this DoDIN workforce differ from those conducting offensive and defensive cyber operations.
Therefore, maintaining a ready-workforce also requires investment to ensure the currency and capacity of those assigned to the DoDIN mission area. based on the NIST Risk Management Framework. 18 Adopting this risk management approach requires an evaluation of the ability of adversaries to attack DoD systems and, more importantly, an assessment of whether such attacks are likely to succeed (e.g., due to the presence of vulnerabilities in DoD systems, or weaknesses in DoD security processes, architecture designs, or supply chains), and the impact a successful attack would have on DoD missions. In particular, such efforts must trace mission activities to the cyber systems they rely on, and identify any vulnerabilities or weaknesses that could be successfully exploited. Therefore, managing risk holistically across the Department promises to be challenging to implement for several reasons.
First, assessing vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with all DoD systems -to include IT and business systems, and the computer components of DoD weapon systems -is no small feat due to the number of such systems in existence. Furthermore, even given assessed levels of risk for all DoD systems, decision-makers may find it challenging to prioritize risk mitigation efforts due to uncertainties about whether high risk systems will be attacked and how the functionality of such systems weighs on the ability to conduct missions in the range of conditions the military could potentially experience (from peacetime to war). Finally, cyber risk changes over time as systems are upgraded or new attacks are enabled by newly discovered vulnerabilities; therefore risk assessments need to be conducted with sufficient regularity to keep up with the pace of change.
Given these challenges, a practical risk management implementation plan is necessary. The
Strategy's objective to "mitigate all known vulnerabilities that present a high risk to DoD networks and data" is a laudable goal, however further work is likely to be required to define specifically how high-risk vulnerabilities will be identified and how risk mitigation efforts can be prioritized and facilitated. DoD acknowledges that it cannot mitigate every risk, thus there are likely to be some successful attacks. Contingency plans and resilience strategies to maintain critical missions in the wake of such attacks, and consequence management initiatives to quickly eject attackers from critical networks are key implementation objectives of the Strategy.
Academic cybersecurity researchers have rightly noted that knowing of the existence of vulnerabilities or even the severity 19 of these vulnerabilities is not enough to know what systems will be successfully attacked. 20 Instead, they recommend augmenting vulnerability and severity information with actual "field data" from systems and big-data analytic techniques to understand attack trends on both known and previously unrecognized vulnerabilities. DoD is in an ideal position to collect data on its fielded systems; however, such data would need to be analyzed and linked to mitigation options as risks are discovered. Doing so merits consideration as part of a practical risk management implementation plan for DoD.
Deliberate Planning for Cyber Operations
Historically, to achieve warfighting objectives, the conventional targeting process was designed to select and prioritize targets and match the appropriate conventional weapon based on operational requirements and available capabilities. 21 Part of doing so is estimating the likelihood that weapons will perform as intended and result in the desired effects (and avoid undesired effects such as collateral damage). Decades of research and development has resulted in a robust capability to make such estimates for conventional weapons, grounded by physics models and extensive testing data. This targeting process and its ability to estimate weapon effects have greatly facilitated construction of military operational plans. Now, the DoD Cyber Strategy is calling for increased integration of cyber operations into such plans to help meet desired strategic end-states. 22 Integrating cyber with conventional operations, therefore, requires measures of the likelihood that cyber operations will succeed against their intended targets. 23 While the physics-based models so prevalent in conventional targeting are not applicable to cyber, the scientific approach used to develop a rigorous process for estimating weapon effects can and should be replicated for cyber operations. That is, large-scale analytic efforts to understand the performance of cyber operations in a variety of operational conditions 7 are needed to enable informed decision-making about the potential for cyber operations to contribute to warfighting objectives and avoid undesired effects. This includes significant testing, data collection, and analysis efforts.
Furthermore, any scientific approach must be tailored to the complexities and uncertainties associated with cyber operations. For example, details about the path between attacker and target, the configuration of the target computer, its defenses, and the behaviors of adversary network defense personnel all affect whether an attack will succeed or fail. Expanding target descriptions to include such aspects relevant to cyber targeting must do so in a way that is tractable given the shorter time periods over which cyber configurations may remain stable on any given target. 24 Nonetheless, successfully integrating cyber operations into DoD deliberate planning activities will require a well-resourced, rigorous approach to estimating the effectiveness of potential future cyber operations.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is my opinion that the DoD Cyber Strategy lays out an ambitious set of goals that are well aligned with operationalizing cyber. However, implementing the initiatives needed to achieve these goals will be challenging due to the difficulties in quickly building and maintaining a capable workforce, assessing risk across the large number of DoD networks and systems, and planning for operations in this highly dynamic environment.
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss this important topic and I look forward to your questions.
